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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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26 February 1985

## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

### CONTENTS

#### MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Editorial on Flaws in Military People's Control Work (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 21, Nov 84) .....	1
Vice Adm D'Yakonskiy on Political Work During Long Voyages (N. D'Yakonskiy; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 21, Nov 84) .....	6

#### ARMED FORCES

Warrant Officer Improperly Discharged (A. Shanayev; ZNAMENOSETS, No 10, Oct 84) .....	12
--	----

#### AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Col Gen Maltsev on Air Defense 'Combat Duty' (I. Maltsev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Jan 85) .....	16
--	----

#### MILITARY HISTORY

Adm Sorokin on Party Role in WWII (A. Sorokin; PRAVDA, 25 Jan 85) .....	20
--	----

#### AFGHANISTAN

Village Sides With Kabul Regime (V. Baykov; PRAVDA, 28 Jan 85) .....	27
---	----

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITORIAL ON FLAWS IN MILITARY PEOPLE'S CONTROL WORK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 84 (signed to press 19 Oct 84) pp 3-7

[Excerpts] Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, creator of our Communist Party and founder of the Soviet State, considered one of the greatest advantages of socialism to be the granting to the broad masses of workers, as the sole and authorized owners of the country, the right to control all aspects of the life of the new society. As early as little more than one month after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution he wrote in an article, "How Should Competition be Organized?," that accounting and control are everywhere, all-encompassing and universal, and that accounting and control over the quantity of work and the distribution of products are the essence of the socialist transformation, once the political rule of the proletariat has been created and secured.

The All-Union Conference of People's Controllers held in Moscow on 5 October 1984 was devoted to further improving the activity of patrol members. It became an important landmark in the development of socialist control in the country. Participation in its work by Communist Party and Soviet State leaders and the speech by Comrade K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium gave special significance to the conference. In a vivid and profound speech, Chernenko gave high marks to the activity of the people's control organs, indicated specific ways to improve them further and emphasized the growing role of control under modern conditions. The party and its Central Committee are firmly and consistently implementing Lenin's ideas and principles of involving the masses, through control, in active participation in running the affairs of state and society, are creatively developing and specifying them at the stage of developed socialism, and are guiding the activity of people's controllers. Ten million activists, functioning in NK [Peoples' Control] committees, groups and posts, are, as a rule, militant and committed people. Their labor services and uncompromising nature in defending state and national interests give them the moral right to check others and demand the elimination of shortcomings. Communists are the nucleus of people's control. There are approximately 4 million communists in the various elements of the NK system.

It was emphasized at the conference that, in the light of current CPSU Central Committee demands and the positions advanced by Konstantin Ustinovich

Chernenko, the organs of people's control are faced with not only more, but also qualitatively new tasks. Peoples' controllers are called upon to render increasing influence in all spheres of economic and social life, and to see and comprehend more thoroughly the results of management, in order better to fulfill their role in preventing and eliminating shortcomings and violations. It is demanded that the effectiveness of the work of NK organs at all levels be significantly improved. "We have entered a period," emphasized Comrade Chernenko in his speech to the people's controllers, "when life is insistently making new and greater demands on the quality of work of all elements forming our society's system of control. People's control is an inherent and, I would say, an irreplaceable part of this system. Thus, the command of our day to bring our activity up to the level of the great tasks now facing us also extends fully to you."

It was emphasized at the conference that people's control exists to help eliminate everything which contradicts the nature of socialism and diverges from its ideals. Take, for example, our sacred principle of socialism: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work. This is the foundation of that social justice which namely our working class and our people, for the first time in history, turned from a dream into living reality. Observance of the socialist principle of rewarding work requires special concern to prevent violations which harm our economy, make the Soviet people indignant and do not fit in our understanding of justice.

The communist Party battles resolutely against violations of the norms and principles of socialist morality and the Soviet way of life. The task set by the party is precise and clear: put an end to bribery and speculation and to the squandering and theft of socialist property through misuse by officials and others. The Soviet people fervently approve this policy. But the matter will not be corrected by verbal statements alone. Specific and decisive actions are needed. Because the people, confronted with phenomena which insult their worth and conscience, are fully justified in wondering where its own people's controllers are looking.

The party teaches that control is most of all active work with people. It is important to take a skillful approach -- strict, demanding and at the same time benevolent. Groundless mistrust and suspicion are not helpful to people's control representatives. Control work cannot be confined to revealing large and small blemishes in our life and giving no quarter to the guilty. It is especially important to notice omissions in a timely manner and keep them from growing into major failures. It is necessary to stress the most painstaking study of the causes of troubles and abuses, and to take steps collectively which can prevent negative phenomena. It is necessary to carry out every check to the end, and not to stop until the situation is corrected. Consequently, checking, preventing and correcting shortcomings must be combined in people's control work.

All of these requirements are also of great importance to the large detachment of army and navy social patrols, functioning in accordance with the Statute on the Procedure for Implementing the Activity of People's Control Organs in the USSR Armed Forces. The instructions and recommendations made in Comrade Chernenko's speech at the All-union Conference of People's Controllers, and

the tasks set before the people's control committees, groups and posts and the patrols, were accepted as a militant program of actions. Ways of implementing them were discussed in the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy at a conference with chairmen of people's control committees in districts, groups of forces and fleets.

Recently, military soviets, commanders, political organs and party organizations have markedly increased their attention to the activity of people's control organs, and have implemented a number of measures to strengthen organizationally the committees, groups and posts. Examining and approving plans for their work and the results of mass checks and raids, and listening to commanders and chiefs of political organs discussing people's control groups and posts and ways of eliminating their shortcomings are increasing the role and authority of these social organs.

The people's control committees, groups and posts in the army and navy concentrate their main efforts on checking the state of storage, safeguarding, use and repair of weapons and equipment; the purposeful and economical expenditure of material and monetary resources; and the organization of feeding, living facilities and medical and retail trade services for the troops; i.e., those questions on which to a significant degree depend the combat readiness of large-units, units and ships and the political and moral state of the personnel. In this regard, the working experience of people's control organs in the Air Force, Central Group of Forces, Moscow and Ural military districts and the Baltic Fleet warrant attention.

At the same time it should be noted that the work of people's control organs still does not everywhere meet the increased demands of the party. In a number of instances it has little influence on the qualitative fulfillment of tasks assigned to units and large units. Here and there necessary attention is not being paid to the care and safekeeping of weapons and equipment. Shortcomings in the work of a number of people's control organs in the Transbaykal and Turkestan military districts and Pacific Fleet in solving questions of amenities services to the personnel, which now influence more and more the morale in military and labor collectives, were criticized at a conference of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Some people's control organs in the Black Sea Fleet and the Moscow Air Defense District are still weak in their struggle against thefts and losses, especially in military trade and construction. Persistence in ensuring timely and complete restitution by officials for material harm caused to the state is not always manifested.

Some committees, groups and posts show little concern about introducing a strict regime of economizing in the expenditure of fuel and lubricants, and their checks frequently are superficial and ineffective. Of course, it is not only the controllers who are at fault in this. A serious reproach is also deserved by those commanders, political organs and party organizations which pay little attention to them, are poor in guiding their work and do not speak in earnest with officials, and whose feeling of responsibility for their work has become dull.

It is also necessary to raise the educational function of people's control committees and groups in propagandizing and explaining the party's demands about economizing and safeguarding and having a proprietary attitude toward the people's property, and about liability for squandering material valuables, and for theft and spoilage of state and military property.

Political organs and party organizations are called upon to make strict demands upon communists who are delegated to people's control organs for their fulfillment of this responsible party assignment; to listen to their reports and accounts systematically; to examine measures aimed at increasing the activity of social patrols and to give them daily assistance in carrying out control and eliminating the shortcomings which are disclosed. Specialists in services, legal employees, newspaper editors and the army and navy community should be involved more widely in checks.

An important task for military soviets, commanders, political organs and party organizations is to organize and explain extensively to the personnel the materials of the conference and to ensure that the speech of Comrade Chernenko is thoroughly studied by all command-political, engineer-technical and managerial cadres, communists and komsomol members. One or two lessons must be devoted to these aims in political training system for all categories of servicemen, and in party and Komsomol training and economic education.

The tasks set forth in Comrade Chernenko's speech, and the results of the conference must be examined in seminars and conferences of the chairmen of committees and groups, and the people's control aktiv in districts, groups of forces, military training institutions, large units and establishments. The participation of commanders and political leaders should be provided for.

Matters of further improving party leadership of army and navy people's control organs in the light of the positions advanced by Comrade Chernenko, of strengthening their role in the struggle to improve the combat readiness of units and ships and the complete supplying of the personnel with all types of provisions are to be examined in all political organs and in the party committees and party bureaus of primary party organizations. A system of measures is to be worked out and implemented to accomplish the tasks set before people's controllers, and extensive involvement in control work by trade union and Komsomol organizations and the entire military community is to be ensured. Specific assistance is to be rendered to people's control committees, groups and posts in improving their activity and increasing the activeness of all army and navy patrols.

It is necessary to pay particular attention to the studies of activists in people's control schools and recurring seminars. It is important to ensure that each of them is an example of high political culture and a model of integrity, high principles and incorruptibility. Painstaking assistance should be given them in mastering the Leninist style of work, and in the ability in any matter, large or small, to rely on the collective and on the knowledge and experience of people, and to take into account their suggestions and requests.

The party views people's control as a most important area of our overall party and state business and considers daily assistance to the controllers as one of its responsibilities. Patrollers always, everywhere and in any situation are active fighters for the communist cause. Peoples controllers in the army and navy are a great social force in the struggle to improve further the military skills of the soldiers and to improve the combat readiness of troops and naval forces.

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### VICE ADM D'YAKONSKIY ON POLITICAL WORK DURING LONG VOYAGES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 84 (signed to press 19 Oct 84) pp 44-48

[Article by Vice Adm N. D'Yakovskiy, member of the Military Council, chief of the Political Administration of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Far From Home Shores"]

[Text] At present our Navy's flag is flying at the most distant latitudes: dozens of ships of various classes and auxiliary vessels are constantly at sea. Naturally, there has been an unusual increase in the amount of work and responsibility of the navy's command and political organs. They see their task as, on the one hand, thoroughly understanding the processes taking place within the crews of ships which are fulfilling military training tasks on the ocean, and on the other hand, exerting an active and exemplary influence on these processes; guiding commanders, political officers, party organizations and navy collectives toward achieving well coordinated crews and the highest level of military skill on the part of servicemen; and inculcating in them readiness to fulfill a military order to defend the socialist Homeland under any circumstances and any place on the world's oceans.

A definite system of party-political support of ocean voyages has taken shape in the navy. The political administration constantly guides unit and ship commanders, political organs and party organizations toward thorough study of the special features of this work on a long voyage and improvement of its forms and methods. The special features I am talking about are determined by many circumstances and, most of all, by the complexity of the tasks being solved in direct proximity to the ships of imperialist states, the remoteness of the areas of sailing and climactic conditions unfamiliar to the personnel.

I would like to emphasize that members of the fleet military council and officers of the political administration, staff, departments, sections and services all take direct part in planning and organizing party-political work on ships going to sea. This enables them to be sensitive to what is new in party-political work on the ships and, at the same time, to eliminate shortcomings effectively and render practical assistance to political workers and party organizations.

Preparation of the personnel for an ocean voyage begins at the base. I will show the role of communists and their organizational and political work based on the example of the "N" submarine. A session of the party buro was held on the eve of the departure for sea. Its subject was how to ensure successful accomplishment of the tasks set by the command. Along with problems concerning the technical readiness of the ship for its departure for sea, communists also solved problems of improving party work. A party meeting was also held sometime later. At this meeting there took place a businesslike and principled discussion of the responsibility of communists for ensuring a high degree of combat readiness of the ship and political vigilance of the crew. Steps were determined to ensure high quality preparation of the equipment for a long journey and to mobilize the sailors to fulfill unconditionally the tasks of a prolonged voyage. Characteristically the communists immediately set about to implement that which was outlined.

Taking into account the nature of the forthcoming military training tasks, necessary adjustments were made to the lesson topics in the main forms of political training. Particular attention in this was devoted to forming a communist world outlook in the personnel and educating them in a spirit of great responsibility for ensuring the security of the Homeland, and to imbuing people with a feeling of hatred toward imperialism, its ideology and morality. Communists conducted discussions which emphasized the need to strengthen tirelessly the might of the Homeland and which revealed the essence of the militaristic, aggressive designs of imperialist forces. On instructions from the party buro, communists Capt Lt I. Kryuchikhin and Sr Lt V. Smirnov gave lectures to the sailors on "Ideological Diversions of Imperialism at the Present Stage," and "The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Increased Role and Tasks of Party Ideological and Mass Political Work Under Conditions of a Developed Socialist Society."

During the preparatory period, seminars took place involving members of agitation and propaganda groups, leaders and assistant leaders of political classes and the party and Komsomol aktiv. In these seminars the activists shared their experience in work aimed at inculcating high moral and political qualities in the men.

On the recommendation of the party buro, the ship's Komsomol committee organized Leninist teachings on the topic, "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Increased Imperialist Aggressiveness and the Need for High Political Vigilance." The lesson began by listening to a record of a speech by Lenin, "Address to the Red Army." Capt Lt I. Kryukhin, a party group organizer, told the sailors about Lenin's characterization of the aggressiveness of American imperialism, given in the works, "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution," and "Letter to the American workers." Warrant officer Ye. Korobkin's talk dealt with the imperialist atrocities in Lebanon, El Salvador and Grenada. An exhibition of literature on the aggressive actions of imperialism was organized for the sailors, and the documentary film, "Be Always On Guard," was shown. On the whole all of this greatly facilitated the formation of the men's moral-political and psychological readiness to fulfill the military training tasks facing the crew on the trip.

On all ships communists were especially and objectively involved with those sailors who were going on their first voyage. Meetings of sailors, petty officers and officers with fleet veterans and participants in long voyages were organized, question and answer sessions were held on the topics, "Do You Know Your Ship?" and "Means of Fighting for Survivability," and competitions were organized for the title of best specialists.

Experience teaches that send-off rituals for ships accomplishing tasks at sea play a big role in creating a military and emotional frame of mind. In a number of units and forces these rituals have become traditional, and they have profound impact on people's consciousness. Thus, in the unit where Capt 2d Rank V. Trukhanenko is serving, a meeting of the personnel takes place on the eve of the ship's departure. The families of the submariners are also invited if circumstances permit. A ceremonial atmosphere, warm parting words and orchestral music all inspire people and raise their military frame of mind.

To a sailor at sea, recollections of his Homeland and the expectation of returning to it are dear. Therefore, we constantly direct the attention of commanders and political organs to the organization of send-offs and meetings of ships' crews. Of no less importance is preparatory work directly on the ship, aimed at gathering materials in advance which link the sailors with their Homeland in a seemingly living and constant way. These items include appropriate literature discussing various regions of the country, as well as about the region where the sailors are serving, and aural letters of congratulations on holidays and birthdays. Their able use helps to create a favorable psychological atmosphere in crews located far from the Homeland.

But, of course letters alone from relatives and close friends will not solve the problem of removing, or it would be more correct to say reducing or "easing," psychological tension on a long trip. At sea each precious bit of information on the life and accomplishments of the Homeland becomes especially valuable. The sailors hold their breath when they listen to the voice of Moscow, and receive with pride communications about the labor successes of the Soviet people. Political officers and party activists consider it one of their most important concerns to ensure that information received by radio is reported to the personnel in a timely fashion. On the submarine discussed above, not only is shipboard radio transmission equipment used for this purpose, but also talks by communists at battle stations about domestic news and world events.

Once the ship goes to sea, the center of party-political work shifts to the combat watch, which directly ensures the security of the voyage and solves many complex and responsible tasks. This is especially characteristic of submarines.

On combat watch, which involves troops of various specialties, the specific traits inherent in the activity of particular sections seem to be erased. Here a spirit of healthy competition is established between specialists of various departments. The watch becomes a special section which lives according to its own laws. For example, on the submarine where officer V. Sorokin serves, party and Komsomol groups are created on each watch,

editors of wall, radio and satirical newspapers are selected and agitators are named. The duty officer is the watch chief. Socialist competition is organized by watches. Every day the duty officer and duty engineer-mechanic together with the watch party group organizer and Komsomol group organizer give an evaluation to each submarine. In this effort the vigilance in which underway watch is conducted; strictness of observance of instructions and order in the compartments; condition of the equipment; precision of fulfillment of the daily schedule and ship's regulations; outward appearance and smartness of the sailors and their military courtesy are all taken into account. Incentive points are also provided for initiative in work to prevent accidents and breakage and for the development and introduction of rationalizers' proposals. Results for the week, month and voyage are tallied, taking into account the points accumulated by the combat watches. Victors are given incentive awards and the best troops and sections are noted in orders issued on results of competition.

On the recommendation of the political administration, this sort of thing is also being practiced on other fleet ships. We are widely propagandizing the experience in ideological and political educational work acquired in the party organization of the large landing ship Aleksandr Nikolayev. An individual approach; attention to each serviceman; active propaganda about the achievements of exceptional personnel in military and political training; and an organic relationship between the entire matter of moral-political education and the specific tasks being solved by the ship at various stages of the trip are characteristic of the communists in this collective. Here they attentively study the sailors' level of education, special training and character. This knowledge is used purposefully in the process of moral-political and psychological tempering. The following example is indicative.

For a long time the service of Seaman A. Dobrotin troubled the command and the party and Komsomol organizations. Overall a literate and erudite sailor who had been allowed to stand underway watch independently earlier than many of his comrades, Dobrotin in the first days of the trip did not function in the best manner and made many mistakes in fulfilling his duties. The sailor was punished and criticized at Komsomol meetings and in the satirical newspaper. However, none of this had much effect on him. But then Lieutenant A. Pestunov, the section agitator and Capt 3d Rank V. Kozlov, a supernumerary propagandist, became involved with the sailor in earnest. They repeatedly spoke with Dobrotin, telling him about the great responsibility which our nation entrusts to its armed defenders located far from the Homeland, in constant contact with forces of the probable enemy. The communists showed him letters to the command from relatives of sailors, instructing them to be always on guard and in constant combat readiness. Then the sailor started thinking about his behavior and began to assess his service from a more demanding standpoint. And he began to stand watch without incident.

Unfortunately, there are many discussions about the importance of individual work and the need to conduct it actively; however, we still rarely use the method of the individual approach in practice, and inadequately teach the aktiv how in fact to influence another coworker. It is a fact that seminars and meetings on the method of the individual approach are conducted only in a general plane. But the activists would like to know what constitutes the

essence, as they say, the specific details of the experience of educational work acquired in a particular party organization.

The problem of further improving the moral-political and psychological preparation of the personnel, as was already discussed above, is especially important on a long trip. Undoubtedly this problem always existed and was solved in one way or another in the crews. However, of late its urgency has risen still further. This is explained by many objective causes: military training tasks which are constantly becoming more complex; the increased intensity and length of distant voyages and alarming changes in the military-political situation in the world. The need to intensify moral-political and psychological tempering is also still dictated by the fact that a certain underassessment of this activity is noted on the part of some political organs, political officers and party organizations. Simply put, some comrades in the fleet are so accustomed to long voyages that they have begun to react to them as to an ordinary, daily matter, forgetting at times that each voyage is the first voyage for a number of sailors, petty officers, warrant officers and officers. And if it is not the first, it is nonetheless a serious test for many young crew members. For them, overcoming the difficulties of the trip is accompanied with overcoming an appreciable psychological barrier which requires their mobilization of spiritual forces and firm moral tempering.

The moral-political and psychological preparation of servicemen is an integral part of the whole system of their training and education. We view it part and parcel with solving the main task -- improving the combat readiness of ships and units. This is why the political administration and fleet commanders, political organs and party organizations are paying more and more attention to the methodological preparation of shipboard communist-leaders. Thus, during one of the long voyages of the anti-submarine warfare cruiser Minsk, representatives of the fleet headquarters and political administration who were on board prepared and conducted a scientific-practical conference of officers, "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Moral-Political Preparation of Troops." Vice Adm N. Yasakov, first deputy fleet commander, gave a report on the heightened aggressive policy of American imperialism, the increasing real threat of war at the present stage and the tasks of officers in raising vigilance. The presentations of officers S. Osetskiy, Ye. Timoshenko, Ye. Zvyagin, S. Mikhasev, A. Chukanov and other comrades raised many problems of the practical activity of commanders and the party organization on the cruiser in inculcating high moral-political and psychological qualities in the sailors. Well prepared in a theoretical sense, these comrades long before the conference thoroughly studied the situation on the cruiser as it solved its military training tasks and, therefore, were able to bring in resourcefully many provisions of their theoretical conclusions and generalizations, by ably relying on facts and examples from the life of the crew. The conference enriched the communists with valuable knowledge.

Experience shows that the basis for success in forming high moral-political and psychological qualities in each soldier or sailor is that they comprehend their military training as socially significant, selfless individual labor which is necessary to the Homeland. And the very process of military labor itself, with its intensity and unavoidable difficulties, tempers an individual. However, the task about which we are speaking is not solved in

and of itself; purposeful, comprehensive educational work is required. Most of all it must ensure that all the troops form such qualities as confidence in the reliability of their military equipment and weapons and in their high operational and fighting capabilities. The ability to service competently the entrusted equipment and to use it skillfully; i. e., the acquisition of thorough practical skills by each specialist in the fleet, is a most important stage in the men's moral-political and psychological tempering.

The crew's tenor of life and service at sea itself plays a special role in teaching the personnel required moral-political and psychological qualities. Here nothing is trivial, nor can it be. The organization of relaxation, mass sports work and various mass cultural measures is a great help in eliminating physical and psychological burdens. Important with respect to this is the use of technical propaganda resources and the library fund, and the selection at the start of the voyage of topical films, tape recordings and records, and the necessary inventory of sports equipment.

We consider it a task of exceptional importance to educate and develop, using various forms and methods, courageous and staunch defenders of the Homeland. "Our army today, as always," emphasized Comrade K. U. Chernenko at an army-wide conference of secretaries of Komsomol organizations, "is strong not only in modern equipment and good training, but also in its ideological enthusiasm and high moral-political spirit."

To conduct our work in such a way that each seaman constantly improves his ideological level, possesses a feeling of responsibility for the exemplary fulfillment of military training tasks and is always prepared to defend the sea boundaries of the Homeland -- this is our duty. We start from this, constantly improving the work of forming high moral and military qualities in the seamen.

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## ARMED FORCES

### WARRANT OFFICER IMPROPERLY DISCHARGED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (Signed to press 25 Sep 84) p 24

[Article by Reserve Colonel A. Shanayev, ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent: "Zig Zags in Mood"]

[Text] My friend, who toiled well in the journalistic field, and later in the cadre organs, is an outstanding person with a sense of humor. Once he joked: "...it is not by the cadres, but in the cadres where everything is decided."

It is a pun, of course, and is not without an implication of bitter irony: when examining questions about transfers and position changes for warrant officers, unfortunately hasty decisions are sometimes made. I again was convinced of the truth of this through looking into a letter which Warrant Officer G. Kuznetsov sent to the editors of the journal. It was a little more than two pages, written in a large, bold script. The tone in which the facts were set down was sometimes calm and reasonable and sometimes bewildered and questioning.

"Dear Editors! How does this happen? Who would expect such zig-zags? They could not work out a transfer to another unit in three months, but three days were enough for a release into the reserves. And what contrasts in effectiveness reports given to me during this time -- it is beyond understanding!"

Even this brief, troubled excerpt from the letter makes one want to check the facts immediately. And we went to the topographers where Warrant Officer G. Kuznetsov had served until recently. We talked with the letter's author, the commander and his deputy, Major A. Navrotskiy. We studied documents, analyzed facts and compared the conclusions of recommendations and effectiveness reports.

Gennadiy Kuznetsov was called up for service in 1975. Before his call-up he finished a technical vocational school and received a specialty as a joiner-carpenter. He served like a young man who since his childhood had been taught not to sit on his hands. And it is no accident that the first effectiveness report on Private Kuznetsov contained these words: "...showed himself to be an industrious, disciplined and hard-working soldier...Awarded the badge, "Excellent Soviet Army Soldier."

A year and a half later he was offered the opportunity to continue service as a warrant officer. He agreed. "He completed the training course with a rating of 'Good.'" And here is his first recommendation for 1978-1982: "...in the position of power plants chief he showed himself to be a hard working, technically proficient specialist and earned the first-class qualification...By nature even tempered and honest...Demanding to himself and his subordinates; always ready to help in a difficult moment..."

The dotted lines in these excerpts from his effectiveness reports and initial recommendation in no way mean that negative comments were omitted in defining the professional, political and moral qualities of Warrant Officer Kuznetsov. There were none in these documents. This is made up for in the next report...But we will return to the recent past.

Warrant Officer Kuznetsov was transferred from the Group of Soviet Forces Germany in February 1983 and was named a training section instructor. After a month he was offered the position of chief of the mess hall. He was granted an apartment. Everything went along well and nothing seemed to foretell any distress to come. But then repairs to the mess hall began, which demanded considerable personnel and resources. Warrant Officer Kuznetsov began to send in reports about the need to allocate appropriate resources for these purposes. Apparently this way of putting the question annoyed Major A. Navrotskiy, who was responsible for the mess hall. Frequent discussions on the matter ended with the situation that Warrant Officer Kuznetsov "did not suit" Navrotskiy: The chief of the mess hall was removed from his position. He was removed and his pay and allowances were arbitrarily stopped. However, after his wife appealed to the higher command, legality was restored.

And then -- it was a commonplace situation: A complaint had to be made!

Here is an excerpt from the session of a hurriedly convened recommendation commission of 12 September 1983: "...during the time he was here...his efficiency declined, his attitude toward fulfilling his duties began to lack initiative and he neglected his work of supervising the mess hall. He reacted in a self-oriented way to assistance...Personally undisciplined, by nature lacking in self control, does not enjoy authority in the collective..." And further in the one and a half page text there are so many negative particles, "un" and prefixes "non" that they were more than sufficient for a supposedly well-founded conclusion: "not suited for his duties...It would be appropriate to release him into the reserves."

I did not want to conclude the story about such an unhappy history with this fact. Therefore, I will cite one more curious document, dated 14 December 1983; i.e., three months later.

"During the time he was here...Warrant Officer Kuznetsov showed himself to be an industrious, disciplined and hard working soldier...He has a conscientious attitude toward his duties. He is courteous to his seniors and reacts properly to their comments. By nature even-tempered. Enjoys authority among his comrades...According to his moral-political and professional qualities he deserves to continue service in the rank of warrant officer."



What is most remarkable about these two reports is that they were written in the same hand and, consequently, by the same person -- Major A. Navrotskiy. His zig-zag mood in assessing the professional qualities of his subordinate, as you see, made a 180 degree turn.

Naturally we were bewildered in reading these documents: Which Navrotskiy to believe? The one who, in a burst of anger on 12 September assiduously selected the derogatory epithets!? Or the one who, in a good mood on 14 December, wrote the unctious words? We asked the commander to explain this metamorphosis.

"At first, perhaps, we were hasty, and later wanted to help him to be transferred..."

I do not know the truth of these words. On the other hand it is known for a certainty that neither the commander, nor his deputy made even the slightest efforts to transfer their subordinate to another duty, or to a new place of service. They chose the easiest, but by far not the fairest path -- release from active duty. And the cadre organ did not look thoroughly into the conflict, but made a hasty decision.

As is known, our commanders and cadre organs are invested with great rights. At the same time substantial responsibilities are placed on them. One of these is to be sensitive and caring toward the needs and requests of their subordinates, and to take an objective approach in evaluating their duty performance. What objectivity could there be with respect to Warrant Officer Kuznetsov, if zig-zags in the mood of his chief had a determining influence on the subordinate's fate?! Ambitious prejudice and a desire to make him pay for his criticism gained the upper hand.

Happily, justice triumphed just the same. After the warrant officer was released into the reserves, the military commissariat and cadre organs again called him up to serve in a unit located not far away, in the position of sergeant major of an aviation squadron.

"He handles his duties in an excellent manner," stated his commander, Guards Major V. Korzun, in a conversation with this correspondent. "He is a hard working and conscientious man."

It was a highly commendable report. And with it one could end this account. However, the question of living quarters still remains unsolved; more accurately, a problem has arisen with his pass. For nearly two years Warrant Officer Kuznetsov has been living in the military topographers' settlement with his wife and child. He was not able to put his pass in order ahead of time. Later an insurmountable barrier was raised to satisfactorily solving this question. I would hope that the senior officials will react with understanding to the service of the warrant officer and, taking into account that he is continuing active military service, help him finally to solve this problem as well.

As for the lack of principle displayed by Major Navrotskiy, I must assume that the political organ and party organization will make an appropriate assessment of this fact.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COL GEN MALTSEV ON AIR DEFENSE 'COMBAT DUTY'

PM311612 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 85 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Aviation Col Gen I. Maltsev, chief of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff, under the rubric "Combat Watch": "A Task of State Importance"]

[Excerpts] In response to the editorial board's appeal before the new year, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers Senior Lt V. Mikhaylov, Capt N. Samoylenko and others have asked for more stories about troops in subunits on combat duty. Taking the readers' wishes into account, the editorial board has instituted the "Combat Duty" rubric which will describe the experience and problems of training for combat duty, ways of improving its quality and instilling a high degree of vigilance in personnel, and other matters connected with fulfillment of combat tasks.

Every day and every hour many troops in various categories of the USSR Armed Forces are on combat duty, which even in peacetime means carrying out a task of state importance. They are performing this task with an acute sense of responsibility for the inviolability of the fatherland's frontiers and the protection of the Soviet people's creative labor. The conclusion the troops draw for themselves from the complex international situation is that they must be constantly vigilant and keep their powder dry.

By and large, the air defense forces' present standard of combat readiness enables them to cope successfully with their tasks and insure the reliable defense of the Soviet skies.

But it must be said that certain shortcomings in the fulfillment of combat duty tasks have not been eradicated everywhere. In some cases certain servicemen have allowed their vigilance to be blunted. Not everywhere is there proper concern for the high-quality selection, training and education of leading cadres for combat control organs. Consequently, there are sometimes cases of indecision on the part of some officers at special tactical classes and exercises. In some cases assessments of the air situation are not full enough for competent decisions to be made when difficult situation arise. Of course, we are taking every measure to totally eradicate these and similar phenomena, isolated though they be, and to insure that all soldiers and sergeants and all ensigns and officers successfully carry out their obligations when on combat duty.

Combat duty.... For every military subunit it means a state of immediate readiness to repulse an enemy attack at any moment and in all situations and to act swiftly, accurately and harmoniously. It means readiness to find very quickly and make effective use of the tactical method that will guarantee total combat success. At the same time, it means the readiness and ability to get as much as possible out of weapons and equipment and to counter any unexpected incident with bravery, endurance and composure.

Clearly, it is not easy to achieve this level of training in a subunit. It demands purposeful efforts by commanders, political organs, staffs and party and Komsomol organizations. And we place the accent on concern for improving the quality of combat duty.

The quality of combat duty is a multifaceted concept. The foundation of its high quality is every serviceman's deep understanding of his personal responsibility for the defense of the motherland and faultless knowledge and execution of the procedures and rules laid down in guides, regulations and instructions. And it is extremely important that every soldier should know well which demands apply to his activity and what he is personally responsible for.

One very important condition of high-quality combat duty is high vigilance on the part of personnel. This is a broad but at the same time specific concept. It envisages increased attention and constant readiness to identify an enemy, to discover his plans on the basis of the smallest clues and, if necessary, to enter into battle immediately. Vigilance means expert handling of weapons and combat equipment, the ability to act decisively and confidently and to use sensible initiative. At the same time, it means supreme organization and discipline.

There is every reason to state that officer cadres, above all commanders with sole responsibility, have the decisive part to play in improving the quality of combat duty. The demands on them are constantly increasing and they are becoming tougher. Today's commander must be firm and skillful in directing subordinate subunits and units and be able to think and act under conditions where time is very strictly limited and where the moral, psychological and physical pressure is enormous. He must be distinguished by competence, a heightened sense of the new and an ability to assume responsibility for the solution of complex tasks. The Air Defense Forces Military Council is constantly devoting attention to instilling these moral and combat qualities in commanders.

[PM311613] It is absolutely clear that it is impossible to attain a high standard of combat duty without the proper military-technical, tactical and specialized training of the personnel. We use the collective term professional skills to describe all this. These skills primarily mean the ability to detect and recognize aerial targets without error and hit them with the first missile launch or the first fighter aircraft sortie, even when the opponent uses antimissile maneuvers and various types of jamming. All this must be learned daily and persistently without permitting any slackness or oversimplification.

This is exactly how personnel training is organized at the N [not further identified] Guards Fighter Aircraft Air Force Regiment. Most airmen there are top-grade specialists. They execute the tasks connected with defending the motherland's air frontiers under complex conditions. Furthermore, true mastery and intelligent actions have been repeatedly displayed by Guards Captains Yu. Buldakov and N. Nasibulin, Guards Majors B. Perminov, V. Antonov, and Yu. Grechukhin, and others. The airmen have learned to make full use of the combat potential of fighter aircraft and their speed, altitude and maneuverability features. Here, just as in our other best units, people have also mastered well the rule that all equipment and armaments with which duty subunits are supplied must be not simply in good order but also highly reliable.

Finally, it is impossible to attain a high standard of combat duty without the utmost coordination and organization in the work of combat control organs. Special responsibility is borne by staff personnel and command center teams. This is why we are constantly concerned to incessantly improve their professional training and their ability to focus their attention on the main thing and work fast and without errors.

It is obvious that these qualities are instilled among the personnel by means of the entire package of purposeful moral-political and psychological training. The commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol aktiv members constantly explain to the servicemen that victory in modern combat can be achieved only by those who possess lofty political, moral-combat and psychological qualities and who are prepared to undergo all kinds of harsh trials for the sake of unconditionally executing their combat tasks. Consequently, the successful solution of combat duty tasks depends to a large degree on the effectiveness of party-political work. Its content determines primarily the further cohesion of personnel round the Communist Party and the persistent and unconditional fulfillment of the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress and Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, regarding the maintenance of high vigilance and constant combat readiness.

This work with servicemen in subunits on combat duty is conducted continuously, actively and creatively and covers all aspects and all elements of this most important type of military activity. This is what military activity is like, for example, in the subunits whose deputy commanders for political matters are Maj G. Demidov, Capt A. Pivovarov and Senior Lt S. Sevruck. Servicemen there are profoundly aware of the complexity of the present international situation and the danger of preparations for war by the imperialist aggressors. The servicemen are incessantly improving the standard of their combat duty.

There is something else I would like to mention. It is impossible to attain high standards in the execution of combat tasks without organizing constant monitoring of both training for and execution of a tour of duty. The staff officers must give the commanders great help in this work.

To improve the standard of combat duty is an exceptionally responsible task. The sentries on duty along the socialist fatherland's air frontiers are fully resolved to justify the trust of the party and the people who have entrusted them with mighty and formidable weapons. They are profoundly aware of their responsibility to serve vigilantly to guard the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the Great October's gains.

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## MILITARY HISTORY

### ADM SOROKIN ON PARTY ROLE IN WWII

PM301241 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 85 First Edition pp 2,3

[Article by Admiral A. Sorokin, first deputy of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "The Fighting Party"]

[Text] The Leninist Communist Party has been the inspirer and organizer of all our accomplishments at all stages of the building, development and defense of socialism and of the Soviet people's struggle for peace and social progress. Its leading role was displayed with special force during the war against Hitlerite fascism, which strove to destroy the first worker-peasant state in history, enslave the world and exterminate entire peoples.

The decades that have passed since then have illuminated even more brilliantly our party's guiding role in the routing of the enemy. The CPSU Central Committee resolution on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War notes that the party, through its multifaceted activity, "insured the firm unity of political, state and military leadership, unity between the Army and the people, and unity between the front and the rear. Responding to its call, the entire country rose to fight fascism to the death. The Communist Party was truly a fighting party.

War is a special condition of society. It is characterized by the utmost strain on the state's material and spiritual forces and the use of all its military potential in armed struggle. The country's transformation into a single combat camp is a task of exceptional complexity. The Communist Party found that the reorganization of Soviet people's lifestyle on a war footing was complicated to the extreme by the sudden and treacherous nature of the enemy's attack, the superiority of his invasion forces, and the loss, at the start of the war, of territory inhabited by about 42 percent of the country's population and producing one-third of its gross industrial output.

Under these circumstances, the "Barbarossa" Plan, envisaging the Soviet Union's destruction through blitzkrieg, appeared realistic to Hitler's generals. Nevertheless, the simple arithmetical calculation of the balance of material potential, which did not take into account the socialist state's sociopolitical and spiritual factors, proved, when put to the test, to be profoundly mistaken. Victory in war belongs to whoever has more reserves, greater sources of strength, and higher endurance among the people. We have more

of all this than imperialism, V.I. Lenin wrote at the very dawn of Soviet power. (See "Complete Collected Works," Vol 39 p 237) All of this increased immeasurably in our country with the building of socialism. Even before the war the USSR had created the material, sociopolitical and spiritual prerequisites for the great victory.

Having realistically assessed the potential of the Soviet state and its Army in the confrontation with the Hitlerite war machine, the Communist Party provided a precise program for routing the enemy in the Appeal to the Soviet People and the 29 June 1941 Directive of the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(B)] Central Committee. With exhaustive completeness it demonstrated the supreme danger of hanging over the country, revealed the just nature of the war and the conditions for gaining victory, and defined the people's tasks. The party slogan "Our case is just. The enemy will be crushed. Victory will be ours!" expressed Soviet people's innermost aspirations and became a powerful material force.

The party insured the national economy's speedy transition to a war footing. It organized uninterrupted supplies of weapons, equipment, material resources, and manpower to the front. Under its leadership, an absolutely unparalleled evacuation of a significant proportion of production forces from frontline areas was accomplished and the foundations of a military-industrial base were laid in the East. Already by mid-1942 it was producing over three-fourths of output for the front. Such a pace and scale of solving military economic questions were hitherto unknown in the world.

The party's agrarian policy also withstood the trial. Despite the fact that the war resulted in agriculture losing considerable arable areas, that the best qualified working people in agriculture left for the front, and that the material base of kolkhozes and sovkhozes was acutely weakened, the party managed to insure the uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs for the front and rear and of the necessary raw materials for industry. The collective organization of agriculture made it possible to solve this complex problem under war conditions.

Our national economy, based on public ownership and the principle of planning, displayed unequalled vitality and dynamism. For example, during the war years, while casting only one-third as much steel and extracting one-fourth as much coal, the USSR produced almost double the quantity of weapons and equipment produced by fascist Germany. The advantages of the socialist system of economic management and the law-governed superiority of our economy were vividly demonstrated.

Displaying concern for scientists and designers, for engineering and technical personnel, for workers in education and medical services, and for workers in literature and the arts, the party Central Committee and local organs directed their creative efforts toward new scientific discoveries, toward developing the best types of weapons and combat equipment in the world, and toward insuring that Soviet society had the material and spiritual factors necessary for victory. Our intelligentsia executed with honor its patriotic duty. It won one of the hardest battles--the battle of minds.



The comprehensive strengthening of the Army and Navy was a determining factor in the party's work from the first days of the war. It resolved such complex problems as fully and quickly mobilizing the Armed Forces, supplying them with the latest equipment and weapons, improving the personnel's skills, training the reserves, stepping up party political work, and organizing combat operations.

Thus, at the very start of the war, it managed to expand the Army's numbers to a size double that of the prewar Armed Forces. And in the 1941-1945 period as a whole, about 10 million persons underwent universal military training and the Army's and Navy's ranks were swelled by over 20 million soldiers, commanders and political workers.

The training of military cadres became the subject of the party's special attention. It fostered a constellation of outstanding Soviet Army and Navy leaders and a large detachment of military commanders, and educated about 2 million officers.

At the cost of extremely strenuous efforts, by 1943 the party and the people had achieved military-strategic equilibrium, followed by decisive superiority for the Red Army. By January 1945 we had 2.1 times as many men, 3 times as many tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 7.3 times as many combat aircraft. Such was the "arithmetic" of the Great Patriotic War's victorious outcome. It is also important to bear in mind the moral-political superiority, determined by our Army's socialist nature, which made it possible to defeat the enemy's superior forces.

The VKP(B) Central Committee and the country's emergency organs set up to conduct the war promptly put forward the basic tasks of military building, examined and resolved questions of strategic operations, determined the direction of main strikes, presented to military science any problems which arose, and sought the practical use of new methods and forms of armed struggle. During the war years the State Defense Committee issued and implemented 10,000 directives and resolutions. There were over 200 sessions of the party Central Committee's Politburo, Organizational Bureau and Secretariat.

Soviet forces engaged in a large number of defensive and offensive operations. The battles for Moscow and Stalingrad, the Kursk Bulge battle, and the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Baltic, Polar, Yassy-Kishinev, Berlin, and other operations are without equals in terms of their scale, execution and military-political results. History convincingly confirmed the vitally important role played by military science in raising the Soviet art of waging war to levels beyond the reach of fascist Germany's generals.

[PM301243] One of the party's main tasks was to insure favorable foreign policy conditions for the enemy's defeat. The farsighted measures that were taken ruled out the possibility of the USSR waging war on two fronts. We managed to create the anti-Hitler coalition, break up the fascist bloc, and force the allies to open--even though with extraordinary delay--the second front against Hitlerite Germany. The experience of cooperation between states with different social systems in taming the aggressor is of abiding

political value. It is topical today, and can be actively used for the purpose of preventing a nuclear missile catastrophe.

Soviet people highly value everything that was done by our allies and the entire antifascist front for the victory. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Soviet people and their Armed Forces made the decisive contribution to the rout of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, the salvation of world civilization, and the creation of favorable conditions for the working people's struggle for their social and national liberation. This is their greatest service to mankind. No lies on the part of bourgeois propaganda and no tricks by the falsifiers of World War II history can hide the truth from the people to belittle the significance of our liberation mission and the socialist system's enormous vitality.

The Communist Party shouldered full responsibility for the fate of the socialist motherland and the outcome of the war. Not only did it determine the precise strategic tasks of the struggle against fascism and mobilize the masses to solve them, but it was itself in the front ranks of those who forged victory at the front end in the rear.

Our party became in V.I. Lenin's words, a "fighting party." This required the utmost intensity of all its strength, knowledge and experience and the ability to influence effectively the awareness of the masses under grim conditions. And it worthily passed the harsh test.

From the first days of the war the party changed many of the forms and methods of its activity and deployed its forces in key positions. This meant a reorganization from top to bottom, from the Central Committee down to each party organization. The party concentrated more than 80 percent of communists in the Armed Forces and the national economic sectors serving the Army and Navy.

The problem of the unity of party, state and military leadership was resolved successfully. The State Defense Committee, set up at the start of the war and headed by I.V. Stalin, general secretary of the VKP(B) Central Committee, concentrated total power in the country in its hands. Eminent political, military and economic leaders headed the most important sectors at the front and in the rear.

In deploying its forces, the party relied on its experience of defending revolutionary gains, amassed in the first years of Soviet power. In order to intensify its influence and enhance the combat ability of units and ships, the party sent its best cadres there. The party superstructure in the Army and Navy was reinforced by the personal mobilization of leading officials, the mass appeals to communists in their capacity as political fighters, and the institution of special regulations for admitting soldiers who had excelled in battle into the party. During the first 6 months of the war alone, about 9,000 leading party officials were sent to the Army and Navy. The Armed Forces' political organs were reorganized and the institution of military commissars was introduced.

Having suffered considerable losses on the front, the Armed Forces' party organizations increased numerically more than fivefold during the war years. During the same period the numerical strength of the party as a whole increased by 50 percent. Over 5 million people were admitted as candidate members and 3.3 million as full members of the VKP(B) in 1941-1945. By the start of 1945, the Red and Navy ranks contained more than 3.3 million communists, or almost 60 percent of the total party membership.

The party concentrated large forces in the partisan detachments and the ranks of underground fighters. The 18 July 1941 VKP(B) Central Committee resolution "On the Organization of Struggle in the Rear of the German Forces" said: "In order to give this entire struggle...the broadest possible scope and combat activeness, the local organization of this work must be undertaken by the leaders of republican, oblast and rayon party and soviet organizations themselves who, in the German-occupied regions, must personally head the groups and detachments of selfless fighters...." This honorable mission was carried out by 565 secretaries of party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, 204 oblispolkom, gorispolkom and rayispolkom chairmen, and 104 secretaries of Komsomol obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms.

[PM301244] The entire Soviet people heeded the party appeal and rose to struggle against the Hitlerite invaders. This struggle by the whole people took the most diverse forms. The party organizations were the organizers of the construction of defense installations. Some 10 million people took part in their construction during the summer and fall of 1941. These installations helped hold back the enemy's mobile units and played an enormous role in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, and other cities.

Using personal example and impassioned party words, the communists inspired Soviet people and led them to victory. More than 3 million sons and daughters of the party gave their lives for the motherland. Almost three-fourths of the soldiers who displayed supreme valor and were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union were communists.

Taking into account man's decisive role in war and the dependence of his behavior on spiritual training, the Communist Party managed to use the means of ideological influence to reorient public awareness toward the solution of problems at the front and in the rear, reveal to Soviet people the just nature of the Great Patriotic War, instill confidence in victory, expose the reactionary and antihuman nature of Hitlerite Germany's ideology and politics, generate a feeling of hatred for the invaders, raise the masses to the defense of socialist gains, and lead them in routing the enslavers. At their sessions, the party Central Committee's Organizational Bureau and Secretariat examined about 90 questions pertaining to ideological and political education. The Main Political Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army issued over 500 directives on the implementation of party resolutions.

The party was constantly building up the spiritual strength of the Soviet people and their soldiers, actively propagandizing the ideas of Marxism-Leninism at the front and in the rear. Over 500 titles by K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin were published during the war years. The total print run

reached 17 million copies. The anthologies of V.I. Lenin's works "On the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland" [O Zashchite Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva], "War Correspondent 1917-1920" [Voyennaya Perepiska 1917-1920], and others were widely distributed. Almost 15,000 books with a total print run of 216.7 million copies were published on political and socioeconomic subjects.

Through its ideological work the Communist Party motivated the masses and guided them toward solving the wartime tasks. It conducted its work in an assertive and differentiating fashion, taking into account the actual situation at different stages of the war. An invaluable role in this was played by military councils, political organs, and the entire party political apparatus.

The party relied on soviets, trade unions and the Komsomol in its activity. It insured their active participation in resolving the most complex problems generated by the war.

Through the party's and people's efforts, Soviet society's economic, scientific, social, moral and political potential was transformed into mighty factors of victory. It was vividly displayed in the crushing blows against the enemy, the selfless labor, and the mass heroism at the front and in the rear. The party slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" sounded the tocsin and accurately reflected the Soviet people's will.

The party successfully played the role of organizer of victory because its entire activity was built on the unshakable foundation of the objective laws of society's development, because it was steadfastly guided by Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland, and because it made skillful use of socialism's great advantages and the historical experience of struggle against foreign enslavers.

The war confirmed most emphatically that a people and army led by a Marxist-Leninist party and closely rallied around it, are invincible. Today this invincibility is augmented by the entire might of our society of developed socialism and of the socialist community countries. This must not be forgotten by the new pretenders to world domination.

[PM301245] The party's role in defending the gains of socialism is not only truly great, but is constantly growing. This is an objective law-governed phenomenon. To improve the party leadership of military building and consolidate the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces--these are commandments of life itself, of the international situation which has deteriorated through the fault of imperialist reaction headed by the United States.

The increased threat of a nuclear missile was generated by the policies of the United States and its allies, the unprecedented rates of development in military matters, and the constantly deepening dependence of the peoples' security on the economic and defense might of the USSR and the other socialist countries and on the combat potential of the Soviet Army and Navy obliging our party, when elaborating its military policy and military doctrine,

to comprehensively analyze, objectively evaluate, and constantly bear in mind the growing complexity and interaction of both international and internal factors of peace and war. The grander the gains of socialism and the greater the danger threatening it, the higher is the CPSU's responsibility to the Soviet people and all mankind for preserving world civilization.

Our party proceeds from the premise that the course of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, pursued by the United States and its NATO partners, is historically doomed. But we will manage to bring this about more successfully as the allied and class solidarity of all the fraternal socialist countries becomes more weighty.

The problem of strengthening peace and security under conditions of international tension requires from the CPSU further improvement in the work by state organs, public organizations, and the whole people to strengthen the USSR Armed Forces. Everything for efficient defense and nothing more than this--this is the requirement of our party which educates Soviet people in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism and readiness to deliver a crushing blow against any aggressor.

Ideological work at present comes increasingly to the forefront of military building. There is constant growth of the role and significance of the theoretical solution of the problems of war and peace, the development of Lenin's teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the nurturing of lofty moral, political and combat qualities among Soviet people and Army and Navy servicemen, and their mobilization for the solution of practical tasks. It is necessary to be more aggressive in exposing the advocates of war.

The party is doing everything to stop the instigators of a new world war. "Let no one entertain the slightest doubt," K.U. Chernenko noted, "we will continue to be concerned with strengthening our country's defense capability and insuring that we have sufficient means to help us cool the hot heads of bellicose adventurers."

Soviet servicemen, closely rallied round the Communist Party and feeling a sense of pride in their socialist motherland, are fully determined to fittingly welcome the 27th CPSU Congress and the 40th anniversary of the great victory. They persistently improve their moral and political qualities, master the complex combat equipment and modern weapons, and augment their contribution to the cause of insuring peace and security and strengthening the country's defense capability.

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AFGHANISTAN

VILLAGE SIDES WITH KABUL REGIME

PM281619 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 85 First Edition p 6

[Dispatch by V. Baykov, PRAVDA correspondent: "Trip to Darabad"]

[Text] Kabul, January--Like a launch on a steep wave, the infantry combat vehicle now dived, following its sharp nose into another pothole in the road, now lifted its nose up high, climbing up a hump. But instead of a watery wake trailing behind, a whitish dust rose up in dense clouds.

Grasping a bracket so as not to fall off, I was seated on armor roughened by numerous scratches and dents. In front of me and behind me it was "straddled" by (Akbar Malyar), secretary of the PDPA committee in the city of Farah, by committee staffers (Nadzhib) and (Kargar), and by several guard soldiers. We were traveling to the village of Darabad, which lies not far from Farah--capital of the eponymous province.

For a long time the village had been under the control of one of the gangs. Its leader (Tazagul) did not join the dushmans in opposing the people's power, but neither did he support it. He lived in his own closed little world. But recently he himself went to the city committee. "I and my people are siding with the revolution and have broken with the past forever," he said to (Akbar Malyar). And our trip today was essentially the first "official" visit to Darabad by representatives of the people's power.

...The hatch cover was thrown back, and vehicle commander Lieutenant (Masud), young, with black hair and a sun-bronzed face, thrust himself out of it. "No-man's-land begins here," he turned to us. His words had the ring of an order: It would be dangerous to stay on the outside.

No-man's-land already? For we had traveled only a few kilometers from the city. The roadside trees stood motionless, as though plunged into somnolence. The road leading off into the peasants' fields was deserted--not a soul on it. What, you might think, could disrupt this rural idyll? But the undeclared war being waged against Afghanistan by its enemies has no clear-cut borders or demarcated front. The lieutenant knows well the location in his province of the invisible but really existing line beyond which the silence of the fields might suddenly be ripped apart by shots.

I recalled my morning conversation at the KHAD (state security service, where we were familiarized with the situation.

Farah is one of the country's largest provinces, occupying one-eighth of the area of Afghanistan. An exclusively agricultural region and extremely backward in an economic respect: The province's 230,000 inhabitants include no more than 100 workers, chiefly servicing a thermal electric power station.

It was here, before the revolution, that the feudal landowners had their largest landholdings, measured in tens of thousands of hectares. The province is also backward in a sociocultural respect: Its population is almost entirely illiterate. There are just 2 small libraries here and no movie theaters, and there are 2 hospitals with 20 beds for the whole province.

The political situation is like this: The people's power controls 40 percent of the province's territory. In its expanses, which total 80,000 square kilometers, approximately 50 numerically small but heavily armed gangs are active. Dushmans terrorize the population and engage in extortion. They treat dissidents brutally. In mountain clefts and caves they have rigged up prisons with torture chambers, where they keep people who have refused to help the "freedom fighters," and the bandits are not averse to getting rich on the "high road." They mount ambushes on the busy main road between Herat and Qandahar.

What, then, can account for the raging banditry in the province and the difficulties in the way of establishing people's power? The consistent interference from abroad on an increasingly wide scale? Yes, undoubtedly. When I caught sight of the terrain of this province from on board the aircraft as we approached Farah, I was struck by how densely the steppe expanses are covered in different directions with the dotted lines of camel trails and vehicle tracks. "Traces of bandit caravans," the pilots explained to me. One of the busiest routes, along which weapons are delivered to remote parts of the country from Pakistan and Iran, passes through Farah Province.

[Text] But, in my view, the Afghan comrades at the KHAD singled out in their account two other reasons which carry far more weight in Farah than in other regions.

First, the earlier dominance there of large landowners in the countryside. Having lost the source of their prosperity after the revolution took their land from them, they became embittered. And now, at the head of gangs, they are taking vengeance both on the people's power and on those poor people who dared to encroach upon their holdings during the land reform. The former feudal lords are the revolutions most implacable enemies.

Second, the backwardness and illiteracy of the overwhelming majority of the local population. Objectively the poorest peasants are the allies of the people's power: It gives them land and brings them light and culture. But 9 out of 10 peasants cannot read or write, and they have a poor grasp of the events taking place in the country.

For centuries the Afghan peasant did backbreaking work for the feudal lord, and the concept "the landowner is my master" became deeply rooted and lives on in his consciousness. Class enemies make use of the peasant's downtroddenness and ignorance. They distort the essence of the programs proclaimed by the government, intimidate peasants, and make them take up arms against the people's power. There are many such deluded people in the gangs. Their road to enlightenment is long and tortuous. But life itself makes those who have gone astray realize who their true friends are, and who are their enemies. The truth of the April revolution is also getting through increasingly clearly to many wayfarers who, like the inhabitants of Darabad, finally side with it. But, truth to tell, such events are still a rarity in Farah.

The village greeted us with cautious silence. Having left the infantry combat vehicle at the edge of the village, we walked in single file along a path beside blind adobe walls. Scouts carrying submachine guns tenaciously followed our every step from the flat roofs of the houses. The tension abated as soon as it was ascertained that we were from Farah. The news of the guests flew from house to house. People began approaching us. There were men of stern appearance with submachine guns and rifles slung over their shoulders and old men in snow-white turbans with waist-length thick curly beards. Separately there were women completely swathed in a cloak and parandja. Black-haired children clung fast to the folds of their clothing. Soon a solid human ring closed around us. Conversation started up. At first about the usual village topics: land, harvest prospects, prices in the bazaar. But then there were questions about innermost thoughts. People are interested chiefly in their future life: Will a school be opened in the village, will the authorities help with seed grain in the spring, will they provide a tractor....

(Akbar Malyar) climbed onto a box so that those right at the back of the crowd could hear the answers.

"The people's power is experiencing difficult times," he enunciated his words. "The struggle against the revolution's enemies, whom foreign patrons supply with everything they need, takes a lot of resources and means. But, despite the difficulties, it is doing the maximum possible for the working people. The time is not far off when you will have a school and not one but many tractors...."

Those present greeted these words with enthusiasm, and the old men nodded their heads in approval.

(Tazagul) mounted the box. On behalf of the villagers he assured the authorities' representatives that they were ready with gun in hand not only to defend their families and dwellings against the counterrevolution but also to participate in fighting and operations against the dushmans, and were ready to help get life going in the province. (Tazagul's) place was taken by an old man in a turban, and then guide a young guy mounted the box....

The meeting, which had arisen spontaneously from the conversation, dragged on. The cooling dusk of the sun touched the horizon. It was time to leave. We



were to return to Farah before nightfall. On the way to the infantry combat vehicle (Akbar Malyar) said with satisfaction: "The establishment of people's power in Darabad might be a small victory, but still it is one more victory over counterrevolution."

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END